February 2025
In recent years, Turkey has succeeded in reshaping its relations towards the Balkans, shifting from establishing a symbolic presence to defining a consistent strategy of economic, cultural, and political influence. Namely, while the European Union is battling its internal political challenges and external threats, and the interest of the United States is stagnating, Ankara is “filling the space” that emerged between ambitions and void. This new positioning of Turkey is not based solely on the rhetoric of the “Ottoman heritage” and deeply rooted remains of the Turkish heritage, which makes up the emotional core of the Balkans, but on a pragmatic mixture of capital, infrastructure projects, and cultural diplomacy, which all together make its footprint in the region.
During 2024, Turkish investments in the Balkans surpassed 15 billion dollars, whereas Turkey allocates its investments evenly throughout the region – cooperating with Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and Albania, but at the same time investing in the so-called “Kosovo”. When speaking of Serbia, the presence of over 800 Turkish companies, such as Taşyapı and Şişecam, expresses the new economic realism of Ankara – the investments are not only profitable, but also strategic. Taşyapı is positioning itself through infrastructure projects, while Şişecam is spreading its industrial capacity and its presence in the region. In the so-called “Kosovo”, Turkish capital is also entering through the construction and energy sector, and thus, Ankara links its economic and political influence throughout the entire Western Balkans.
The infrastructure projects conducted in Serbia and throughout the region, such as the construction of the Belgrade-Sarajevo highway or the networks of smaller bridges, financed by TİKA, have a dual function: economic and diplomatic. With such initiatives, Turkey is positioning itself as an actor that brings concrete results, contrary to often slow European processes. This model of “efficient aid” has become a key instrument of soft power, especially in countries with a persistent feeling of disappointment with the EU accession process.
At the same time, Turkish banks and the Chamber of Commerce act as an “extension” of state policies. For example, in Tirana and Sarajevo, financial instruments from Istanbul are often presented as “friendly investments”, which Ankara unequivocally uses for deepening the sense of closeness and solidarity with its Balkan partners. However, the critics are warning that this model has the potential to cause dependence and create a structure of influence which could, when speaking of long-term consequences, limit the economic independence of smaller countries, such as the countries of the Western Balkans.
The cultural dimension of the Turkish presence in the Balkans is the most efficient and, at the same time, most deeply rooted and long-term role. Namely, through a network of Yunus Emre institutes, TİKA foundation, and media houses such as TRT, Turkey is promoting a narrative of common history, spiritual closeness, and brotherhood of the two nations. Turkish soap operas, which are extensively watched throughout the region, have become a soft power channel that builds a unique and quite potent emotional channel, especially among the younger generation and middle-aged population.
Moreover, it is noticeable that in many countries, such as Skopje, Novi Pazar, to name just a few, Turkish foundations are financing restorations of cultural and religious objects, which has a double effect: primarily, the said is being conducted in the name of preservation of the Ottoman heritage in the Balkans, but also for reconfiguration the identity space of the Balkan as oriental, and not European. Thus, in this way, Ankara is gradually taking up the role of the protector of Muslim communities in the region, positioning itself as a spiritual and political patron.
Still, it is indicative that this approach, in some countries characterized by a sensitive ethnic balance, is met with caution. Namely, in North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkish cultural influence is sometimes perceived as a tool of “soft pressure”, which incites division of loyalty. This is exactly why Ankara is closely calculating between symbolic presence and pragmatic unobtrusiveness.
It is also important to stress that the Balkans is at the same time one of the rare regions where Ankara succeeds in combining cooperation with the West and projection of its own power. Even though a NATO member state, it is obvious that, in recent years, Ankara has acted as an autonomous actor, stressing the fact that, as such, it can negotiate with the European Union regarding investments, and at the same time maintain close relations with Belgrade and Moscow. For the countries of the region, this “Turkish balance” has both advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, Turkey is offering access to capital and infrastructure without ideological conditions. On the other hand, this model brings along a new model of dependence – either political, financial, or narrative. Namely, Turkey definitely is not a replacement for the European Union, but it is becoming an increasingly present intermediary between the East and the West, which makes it a factor that must be taken into consideration in every regional stability strategy.
In the end, it is necessary to state that the Turkish policies in the Balkans we see today are not sudden, but a result of a long-term evolution. Even though in the beginning of the 2010s, its approach was predominantly ideological and based on the rhetoric of neo-Ottomanism, today, it is pragmatically, economically, and culturally sophisticated. This change makes the Turkish influence less visible, but more deeply rooted. Thus, Turkey is no longer a guest in the “European periphery”, but is quite a significant actor that shapes currents, topics, and symbols of a region that is still searching for its place between the East and the West.
Authors: dr Violeta Rašković Talović, Tanja Kazić