March 2025
Two years after the outbreak of conflict between the members of the official Sudan Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, a paramilitary formation initially formed during the rule of the former President Omar al-Bashir, Khartoum transformed from a classical conflict zone into a symbol of continuity of African wars fed by the thirst for resources, and not ideology. Instead of a clear articulation of political visions, both sides direct their aspirations towards gaining control over the main economic arteries of this state – gold mines, transport corridors, and access to Red Sea ports. The conflict, which initially began with the balance of power between two centers of power, grew into a complex system of parallel economic and geopolitical rivalries, where each side tends to transform the control over resources into leverage of political survival.
In such a constellation of powers, gold has become more than a symbol of wealth – it represents an energy source and the most potent catalyzer of war. Namely, even in the midst of war, the Sudanese Mineral Resources Company stresses that, in 2024, Sudan produced a record 64,4 tons of gold, thus generating around 1.6 billion dollars of income; more than two-thirds of gold mines are outside of state control. The majority of illegal gold trade is controlled by the Rapid Support Forces, which, with the use of a network of intermediaries, and usually through secret channels, towards the United Arab Emirates, are exchanging gold for financial and military support. On the other side, the national Sudan Armed Forces are using the control over administrative structures and formal institutions, over which they gained control once again earlier this month, to secure and confirm the legitimacy of the Government and preserve the existing international contacts. With the moves drawn by both sides, the Sudanese civil war has become a sort of economic system in which both sides profit from its prolongation.
Due to the existence of significant amounts of resources in the country, the Sudanese crisis has inevitably become the knot of regional and global interests. Egypt is actively supporting the national Armed Forces, perceiving General Abdel-Fattah al-Burkhan as the guarantor of stability and a potent counterbalance against Islamist factions acting in collusion with the Rapid Support Forces, additionally destabilizing the state and the region. On the other side, the United Arab Emirates, by supporting the other side, sees in the Rapid Support Forces an instrument of preservation of access to gold mines and the control of trade via the Red Sea. Russia, through a network of companies linked to the former private military company Wagner, which is nowadays present on the African continent through the actions of the “African Corps”, is present in the West and the South of Sudan, where it is participating in the exploitation of ore deposits and is providing the RSF with arms in exchange for resources. Iran, by attempting to broaden its influence to the Red Sea coast, is developing relations with some factions within the national Armed Forces of Sudan, offering UAVs and intelligence support.
In simple words, the Sudan is currently at the crossroads of the interests of powers, who, at the moment, are intensively reshaping the regional order. Even though the international community perceives the Sudanese conflict predominantly through a prism of a humanitarian crisis, it is indicative that the real processes that are currently ongoing in the country show that, in this case, we are speaking of the restructuring of power, whereas the resources, and predominantly gold, become the main currency for securing power.
Speaking of the previously mentioned humanitarian crisis, while the elites and paramilitary structures are trading in gold and arms, the Sudanese population is paying the price of war with hunger, displacement, both internally and outside the borders of their own countries, as well as with institutional collapse. More than ten million Sudanese have become displaced, and hunger has reached levels that resemble the darkest periods of Sudanese history. Urban environments, such as Khartoum and Omdurman, are denounced to ruins, while in the periphery, the new, local centers of power are emerging.
Those local actors, whether we are speaking of tribal councils or paramilitary formations, are gradually taking control over the territories that are outside the domain of both waging parties. In this way, the Sudan is threatened by imminent decline into a fragmented state of dissolution of the state and structural violence, resembling the periods after civil wars from the end of the 20th century. This situation is creating the risk of permanent “Somalization” of Sudan, shifting to the extended state of absence of centralized government, in which the power is based exclusively on the control of resources and foreign aid.
Overspill of the Sudan conflict is already visible in neighboring countries. Namely, in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), we register an increased presence of Sudanese militants, while the borders with these countries have become channels for trafficking arms, oil, and minerals, and especially gold.
The attempts of international mediation, predominantly by the African Union and Saudi Arabia, are limited for the time being. We do not find the reason for this exclusively in the complexity of the Sudanese conflict, but also in the absence of a common interest of foreign actors. For the majority of them, Sudan is the means, and not the goal: a space in which the new spheres of influence in the post-American era are being shaped.
Still, the potential for the stabilization of the state is present, though it asks for a complete change of approach. Instead of imposing political solutions, it is necessary to build economic infrastructure, which would return the resource trade to the state. This would imply the establishment of transparent mechanisms for trade control, limitation of private trade channels, and inclusion of local communities in the processes of mineral resources management. Without that, every peace process will end up being just a mere short-term de-escalation of conflict, which is being nourished with gold.
The contemporary Sudan is not an isolated case, but a clear indicator of a wider global process, in which resources replace institutions as holders of power. Once, sovereignty was based on the monopoly of the state over violence. Nowadays, it is being built on the monopoly over trade. The Sudanese gold economy, in which the Sudanese militias and paramilitary formations are the miners, the traders, and political actors, too, represents a laboratory for understanding the future conflicts in Africa and beyond.
“From gold to ashes”, thus, is not only a metaphor of the Sudanese tragedy – it is also a warning to the world, which is declining into complete fragmentation, that resources without institutions become the catalyzers of collapse. Sudan shows us that, in the absence of a center, the power is transferred into the hands of those who control financial flows – and peace becomes a luxury not only financed with gold, but lost in its shine.
Author: Tanja Kazić