February 2025
With the worsening of the political and security situation in Libya and in the Sahel region in 2024, it was once again confirmed that the escalation of violence and deepening of the instability in Africa cannot be perceived as an isolated regional phenomenon. Especially the worsening of the political and security situation in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, paired with continuing conflicts in Libya, generates political, security, and migration implications directly affecting Europe – and indirectly the Balkans as well.
As a region which has for almost a decade been functioning as an external border of the European Union and a corridor of migrations, the Balkans has gradually transformed into a “secondary front” into which the consequences of initially Middle Eastern, and today African crises, are reflected. In the moment when the European Union is faced with limited instruments for the stabilization of the Sahel region, and the focus of the NATO Alliance is directed towards the East, the countries of the Western Balkans are increasingly often becoming a part of a wider security architecture that reacts to the processes outside its direct environment.
The overthrow of pro-European governments in a series of countries of the Sahel region in coups, paired with an increase in the influence of Russian and local paramilitary structures, has created a new geopolitical reality in Africa. The Russian presence, manifested on the African continent in the form of “African Corps” (the forerunner of Wagner), has contributed to the consolidation of the new authoritarian regimes, and not to the establishment of long-term stability. Instead of that, the Sahel has become a center for spillover of arms trafficking, illegal migration flows, and strengthening of ideological narratives, which are increasingly often finding their way to the north.
Libya, which is still functioning as a country divided along the East-West line, represents the key transit point of this process. The lack of a unique government and fragmented security structure in the country enables criminal and terrorist groups in the country to act unhindered, while at the same time, they control the migration flow towards the Mediterranean. In this context, the Balkans are not merely a geographical transit zone, but also a potential space for the social and political effects of the African instability.
The migration flows transiting through Serbia and other countries of the region are increasingly reflecting the wider geopolitical processes in Africa. Namely, during the last few years, and especially during 2024, there has been an increase in the number of migrants arriving from Sudan, Chad, Niger, and Libya, which indicates a transformation of the classical Balkan route from a route colored by Middle Eastern geographical identifiers into a broader system that now links Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. This phenomenon does not bring exclusively humanitarian challenges, but also the risk of security implications, especially in terms of infiltration of criminal and extremist structures into Balkan networks.
Besides migrations, a growing influence of African crises is also evident in the energy and general economic prism. The disruptions in energy supply, trade, and security of the Mediterranean impact the Balkan economies, which are deeply linked with the Italian and Greek markets. Especially the instability in Libya, which represents a significant exporter of oil and gas, indirectly increases the pressure on the European energy market, which then overspills into the Balkans through the increase in prices and energy instability.
In the geopolitical sense, the African instability offers a chance for strengthening the influence of foreign actors in Europe. Russia and China are increasingly often using African partners as leverage in broader relations with the European Union, while Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Russia project their interests via Libya towards the Mediterranean and the Balkans. This opens up the following question: Is the Balkan region a mere observer of these processes, or in fact their active part?
The presence of foreign investments linked with the countries acting in the African context points to an accelerated linking of the Balkan and African geopolitical spaces. At the same time, some countries of the region, such as Serbia and Croatia, are renewing their historical contacts with African countries in the context of economic diplomacy, which is increasingly positioning Libya and the Sahel region as elements of some future Balkan strategies, opposite to the EU countries, which are gradually stepping away from this African region.
The conflicts in Libya and the wider Sahel region, therefore, should not be solely perceived as local and regional crises, but they have also transformed into global challenges passed in waves to the Southeastern part of Europe. If the security vacuum continues to dominate Africa, the Balkan region will continually suffer the consequences, be it through migration routes or through economic and energy dependence.
For a region traditionally oriented towards EU integration, the key task in the years to come will, by all means, be to construct mechanisms for early warning and coordination with the European security structures. The Balkan region is not just the periphery anymore, but a potential early warning system for Europe. Therefore, understanding African crises and their consequences becomes the precondition for the preservation of stability in our own backyard.
Author: Tanja Kazić