April 2025
Years after the “Islamic State” (IS) had lost its last stronghold in Baghouz (in March 2019), its symbols, tactics, and organizational cells are once again resurrecting in the southern, central, and eastern Syria. And while the world’s attention is redirected towards the war in Ukraine and the new configuration of power in Eurasia, in Syria, there is an ongoing process that points to the fact that, in the era of the new Syrian regime after decades of the rule of the Al-Assad family, nowadays, we are witnessing the “Islamic State” that is no longer a “military organization without a strictly defined territory”, but a hybrid network with increasingly complex sources of financing and local allies.
Re-intensification of activities of the “Islamic State” at the end of 2024 and the beginning of 2025 is the result of the combination of structural weaknesses of the state, local conflicts, and foreign policy fragmentation of the region. Even though we are speaking of a different, less centralized organization compared to the “Caliphate” from 2014, the adaptation of this organization to the new conditions shows a long-term potential for destabilization, especially in the Deir ez-Zor-Homs-Raqqa area.
The revitalization of the activities of the “Islamic State” in Syria is not taking place through the classical form of occupying the territory, but through the model of establishing “mobile cells” that use “empty spaces” between the zones under the control of the new Syrian regime, Russia, Iran, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Namely, even though the “Islamic State” has been perceived since 2019 as “conquered”, from 2023, there is a rise in the number of attacks against the Syrian forces in the Badiya desert. Even though we are primarily speaking of limited actions, its geographical dispersion shows that the “Islamic State” is no longer only an organization that is “surviving”, but in fact a network that is once again testing the state sovereignty of Syria.
The logistical centers of the “Islamic State” are positioned predominantly in the desert zones, in the eastern part of Homs and along the border with Iraq, where monitoring is limited, and the conditions for oil and arms trafficking are excellent, whereas conditions are met to form a stable inflow of finances for this terrorist organization. Some US reports from 2024 show that, in this zone, there are around 2,500 active fighters, but their support network – financial, intelligence, and logistical- is quite strong.
Namely, the reestablishment of the oil, arms, and other significant goods trafficking channels in the western part of Badiya is partially used for exports into Iraq, thus used for generating direct revenue, but also for financing local militias. Such a model of a “de-controlled economy of war” enables the “Islamic State” to survive without a visible command center and without the need for classical territorial management.
The key factor of the new rise of the “Islamic State” is not rooted in the power of this terrorist organization, but in the weakness of the state itself. Syria is now formally governed by the new President Ahmad al-Shaara, but his regime is, in essence, the continuation of the old structure of power, in a somewhat softer form and with apparent reforms. Even though presented as a “post-war” leader who wishes for the democratization and repatriation of foreign fighters, the system remains deeply dependent on the foreign military support, and above all, Russia and Iran. The administration still functions through the network of local intermediaries, patronage, and corruption. In the east of the country, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), supported by the United States, are facing an increasing dissatisfaction of the Arab population, which is being skillfully used by the “Islamic State” as an instrument for the recruitment and renewal of its cells.
The renewal of relations between the Turkish and Syrian officials during 2024 did not result in a coordinated action in the fight against terrorism, but simply additionally complicated the relations in the northern part of the country. In such an ambiance, the “Islamic State” acts as a “symptom of anarchy” – a smaller player surviving thanks to the failure of the big ones.
And while the West remains focused on Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific region, with marginal interest in the conflict between Israel and Palestine (or Israel and Iran), the Middle Eastern security dynamics are becoming increasingly marginalized. The United States maintains a limited presence in the Eastern part of Syria, but without a clear strategy for post-conflict stabilization. On the other side, Russia, burdened by the war in Ukraine, is becoming quite a common practice that the operations against the “Islamic State” are conducted by the Iranian forces and the regime units, thus creating a space in which terrorist cells move between different zones of influence, not facing an integrated response.
Moreover, we have also registered a renewal of connections between local criminal groups and extremist networks in Syria, Iraq, and Jordan, which points to the fact that the “Islamic State” is no longer a mere terrorist organization, but an exquisite network for the self-organization of marginalized groups. This process is especially pronounced in the regions where the state infrastructure is destroyed, and the economic recovery is minimal.
In the end, the return of the “Islamic State” and its existence in 2025 should not be perceived as a “renaissance” of a “caliphate”, but more as an evolution of an idea – adapted to the conditions of chronic dissolution of a state and fragmentation of a region. Its strategy is no longer directed towards conquest, but towards survival: infiltration, criminal economy, and psychological influence. From all the previously stated, we can draw a clear conclusion that without a comprehensive reconstruction of the state and the inclusion of local communities in the processes of ensuring security and management, the “Islamic State” will continue to function as an invisible actor of the Syrian conflict. The return of the “Islamic State” is not the return of power, but the return of the void the country did not manage to fill.
Authors: Tanja Kazić, dr Violeta Rašković Talović