June 2025
Fifteen years after the region formally stepped out of the period of mass armed conflicts, the Balkans is once again entering into focus of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. The war in Ukraine, energy insecurity, cyber threats, and the growing influence of third actors, such as Russia, China, and Turkey, are raising the level of regional sensitivity. This is opening up a series of questions regarding the ability of NATO to ensure stability in the space, which remains geostrategically significant but politically fragile. In other words, the region is once again functioning as a zone in which the “virus of instability” is spreading fast when the institutional immunity goes weak.
While the end of the first decade of the 21st century brought along a relative consolidation of the Euro-Atlantic influence, the 2020s generated a new reality. Populism, hybrid threats, and skepticism against Western institutions are on the rise. This opens up a series of questions about the resilience of the existing mechanisms. In other words, NATO must adapt its approach and create a framework for cooperation that can contain global disruptions and regional specifics.
The conflict in Ukraine and the deepened American-Chinese rivalry are changing the European security architecture. In this context, the Balkans emerge as a link between the southeastern NATO wing and the unstable zones in the Middle East and Black Sea. This opens up a series of questions regarding the strategic positioning of the region, because its geopolitical value increases, but at the same time, the risks increase as well.
In such an environment, three fundamental security risks are visible. The first one is the political fragmentation and institutional weakness, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where ethnic lines are being used as an instrument of pressure. The second one includes the growth of information and cyber threats, manifested through coordinated disinformation campaigns and attacks against key systems. This is opening up a series of questions regarding the resilience of critical infrastructure. The third risk implies energy and economic dependence, which is reducing the total “social immunity” of the countries of the region and thus increases space for foreign influence. In other words, the weaknesses transfer fast, similar to pathogen processes in medicine.
NATO cannot function solely as a military alliance in such conditions. Thus, it takes up the role of a platform for political stabilization, strengthening resilience, and hybrid warfare. This opens up a series of questions about the scope and depth of arrangements in the region.
Since 2023, the Alliance has been redefining its approach to Southeastern Europe. The Enhanced Forward Presence Program now includes Romania and Bulgaria as well, and a limited presence for the countries of the Western Balkans is currently examined as well, through “partner nodes”. We are speaking of logistics centers, intelligence activities, and training that fit national capacities. In other words, a model is developed that prevents excessive meddling but strengthens regional cohesion.
In the region, the positions of countries are different. Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Albania are already members. Serbia remains militarily neutral, but still maintains cooperation within the Partnership for Peace. Bosnia and Herzegovina has an active Membership Action Plan, but the existing political cleavages are limiting its advancement. The so-called “Kosovo” is attempting to position itself as a “partner of special interest”, with the support of Turkey. This is opening up a series of questions about the homogenization of security standards.
In the last few years, NATO has been giving up the concept of a unified tempo of expansion and thus shifted to pragmatic integration. The focus passes from formal partnership to the application of standards in defense, training, and intelligence cooperation. A mechanism of de facto integration without political pressure and without direct opening of new lines of conflict with Moscow is being developed.
The role of Turkey is becoming more and more visible. As a NATO Member State and an independent regional actor, it acts as an intermediary between Western strategic goals and local political realities. Its presence in the security structures of the so-called “Kosovo” and strong relations with Sarajevo and Skopje make it a factor of stability, but also open up a series of questions in terms of relations with Greece. For NATO, it is of key importance to restrain the Turkish initiative within the common framework, and not within parallel structures.
The European Union remains an important partner, but acts slowly and is imbalanced. While Brussels insists on reforms and the rule of law, NATO is focusing on urgent security aspects. This opens up a series of questions about the effectiveness of the Euro-Atlantic engagement, if better synergy in financing and project implementation is not achieved.
By mid-2025, NATO clearly defined a new approach: the Balkans are no longer a zone of post-conflict operations, but a space of preventive stabilities. Instead of reactive actions, the alliance is developing the concept of “dynamic presence”, based on constant training, civil-military missions, and integration of local security agencies into joint systems. In other words, the political DNA of the security framework is becoming adaptive and proactive.
If this model functions, the Balkans could become an example of transformation in a period in which classical military alliances no longer guarantee peace. If it does not function, the region would once again become the arena for the competition of the great powers.
In the second half of the 2020s, the stability of the Balkans depends on the ability of NATO to develop an inclusive, adaptive, and sustainable security framework. This implies delicate balancing between military prevention and political fragility, strengthening local institutions without endangering sovereignty, and gradual rapprochement to the Euro-Atlantic structure without coercion. In other words, the stability is perceived as a process that demands constant adaptation, and not as a final result.
Author: Miloš Grozdanović