June 2025
Energy security of Southeastern Europe entered the focus as soon as the war in Ukraine changed the power balance and redefined the approach to Russia, and thus, I almost instantly see that the region which for decades lived on Russian gas is turning to diversification and is creating some form of a controlled chaos, in which each country is seeking for its own place, attempting to balance between technique, politics, and their own pockets. Three years later, I see this process moving in a zigzag line, because political interests, geopolitical pressures, and economic possibilities are dictating the tempo much more than the energy logic itself.
Today, the Balkans are in fact offering three separate energy visions living in parallel and colliding: the European one, insisting on the green transition and market integration; a Russian one, which plays the card of the old infrastructural heritage; and the regional one, which is attempting to get a grip of balance between security of supply and financial sustainability. Regarding this, the issue of energy independence from Russian gas is becoming a symbol of political sovereignty, but also a reflection of the analytical depth of the crisis, and everything the European continent has been pushing under the rug for years can be seen.
Until 2021, more than three-fourths of total gas in Southeastern Europe arrived from Russia, and the fall to 40% until mid-2025 looks impressive on paper, but still exhibits structural dependence of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The LNG terminals in Alexandroupoulis and in Krk are changing the map, the Greek interconnectors are accelerating the rhythm, and Greece is increasingly better managing the role of the regional energy hub, while Bulgaria is attempting to prove that it also has something to say in this new security architecture.
At the same time, Romania is strengthening its status via the Black Sea, it is increasing its investments into the transport gas pipeline BRUA, and is visibly changing its energy destiny by transferring from the category of importer to the category of exporter. Regarding this, it is becoming clear that national politics are still sticking out – the EU member states are attempting to blend in with the European rules, while the countries outside the Union are maintaining closeness with the Gasprom Company for practical and historical reasons, which is creating a sort of asymmetry that is complicating each attempt of common regional strategy.
Russia, even though retracting from the European energy sector, is persistently maintaining its presence through ownership structure and distributive companies, and thus, in Serbia and the Republic of Srpska, it is still maintaining a small but effective channel of political pressure. On the other side, Turkey is entering as an ambitious intermediary with an idea of establishing a Turkish hub, in a wish to connect Russian, Azerbaijani, and eventually Middle Eastern resources, and thus the region is gaining an additional dimension, in which the energy ambitions of Ankara are changing the rules of the game.
The registry of regional actors also includes China, with its infrastructural investments, Azerbaijan, with TAP and the trans-Balkan route, as well as the United States, which is pushing for LNG exports, and thus, Southeastern Europe is becoming a narrow energy hub, almost a laboratory in which geopolitical ambitions and market instincts intertwine without a clear order. This space escapes between market and politics, and regarding this, the securitization of everyday life is gaining a new form – energy transforms into a political instrument, and not just a resource.
The Energy Community and the new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans from 2024 are setting the goal for the regional gas and electricity markets to fuse into one system, but every advancement is being sabotaged by the weakness of the infrastructure and the insufficient coordination of institutions. The shortage of interconnectors, storage capacities, and work transparency in national companies is holding the region in the net of energy islands, and not in a functional system.
The European Investment Bank and the EBRD invest more than three billion euros into projects of renewable sources and energy efficiency, but the region has not succeed to accelerate the processes without better institutional cooperation, joint gas reserves, and a constant regional center for energy crises. Regarding this, it has become clear that political will is becoming the most expensive currency in the energy sector.
While there is an ongoing debate on gas, renewable energy is exploding. Greece and Croatia are the leaders in this field, while Serbia, North Macedonia, and Albania are getting the hang of it, but the transition is not running smoothly and is bumpy at each corner due to insufficiently developed network infrastructure and slow administration.
All these points point to the fact that energy independence does not emerge with a mere replacement of Russian gas with alternative sources, but through a deep transformation of consumption and by transitioning to green energy. The regions that are showing their vulnerability through joint policies and investments are entering the new phase of resilience that is not only economic, but political as well.
Up to mid-2025, Southeastern Europe is no longer a periphery, but a testing polygon for new European energy security, but the stability of this process depends on three things: regional cooperation, institutional resilience, and long-term European dedication. Energy independence does not mean isolation but a network of trust in which countries jointly manage risks, share resources, and act as a unified system.
For the Balkans, this represents a transmission from the history of dependence into the history of responsibility, where the controlled chaos is being transformed into a sustainable energy image of the future, and the region emerges as a space that not only does not react to crises, but also reshapes them through a new logic of cooperation and resilience.
Author: Miljan Petrović