August 2025
The Balkans entered in 2025 into a new phase of political and security uncertainty, because the region is at the same time following the signals from Brussels and its own politics of unsolved national issues that still determine the rhythm of stability. The European Union enlargement process remains the most significant strategic framework for the majority of Western Balkans states, but its slow nature is creating a climate in which local political actors are beginning to question the motives and seek alternative sources of influence. This opens up a series of questions about whether the European project is still able to function as the main mechanism for the stabilization of the region. In other words, the Balkans remains a space where national interests, identity tensions, and geopolitical competitions at the same time shape the political DNA of each country.
Regarding this, the state of regional security resembles an organism exposed to constant stressors exactly because the unsolved relations between Belgrade and Pristina are shaping the entire security architecture of the Southeastern Europe, whereas the it is clearly visible that the burden of instability is not split equally, but is, to the greatest extent, held by Serbia, who is persistently trying to preserve its political DNA and territorial integrity despite the pressures. The normalization of relations is not making any progress, because Pristina is continuously avoiding the compromise models, at the same time heightening tensions in the region through unilateral moves, while the dynamics in the field are periodically showing signs of an acute destabilization that targets mostly the Serbian population situated to the south and north of the Ibar River. The virus of instability is entering circulation each time a constructive political signal is absent, but this is primarily felt by the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija, since they are located in an environment that reacts to each institutional asymmetry and each shift of the political focus. This opens up a series of questions regarding whether the European Union indeed has capacities to impose a clear temporal framework for a dialogue and whether it is ready to apply concrete instruments of pressure on Pristina, instead of expecting Belgrade to fulfill its obligations unilaterally. In other words, the relations between Belgrade and Pristina remain a test not only for the credibility of the European project, but also for the ability of Europe to recognize the real security risks Serbia is exposed to and to acknowledge them in accordance with the principles the EU itself calls upon.
Bosnia and Herzegovina functions as the most complex case of political fragmentation in Europe, which is creating a permanent institutional weakness. The entity tensions, disputable constitutional architecture, and deep political cleavages are making any kind of internal reform momentum difficult. In other words, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a country with a chronic imbalance between formal Statehood and the real political functionality. Regarding this, the securitization of everyday life thus becomes a part of the political landscape, because the citizens are living in a system in which political crises directly impact the economic security, social flows, and international relations.
Montenegro is balancing between the European path and the internal identity cleavages that impact every political cycle. The dynamics of government and opposition, changeable coalitions, and the impact of foreign policy actors are creating a climate that is not easily stabilized, even beyond the existence of a formal institutional framework. This opens up a series of questions about the capacity of the state to construct a stable social immunity to political turbulences that emerge from identity cleavages and foreign meddling. In other words, Montenegro remains in a state of political oscillation, which impacts its European course. Regarding this, the analytical depth of the crisis becomes visible when the internal political dynamics and foreign policies and relations are examined in parallel, because the interests of the EU, NATO, and other centers of power intertwine.
In North Macedonia and Albania, the European path maintains a relatively stable tempo, though both countries are feeling the fatigue due to the slowness of the European processes. In North Macedonia, the unsolved identity issues and disputes with the neighbors are additionally complicating the international course. Albania, even though stable politically, is still making an effort to modernize institutions and strengthen the state’s capacities. This is opening up a series of questions about the ability of the European Union to remain a credible actor, especially at a moment when its own internal disputes are slowing down the decision-making process. In other words, even the countries that are moving into a good direction do not see the horizon of integration clearly enough.
Regarding this, the wider security context is playing an increasingly significant role. The energy transition in Europe, the changes in global supply chains, migration pressures, and the new phase of relations between the East and Russia are shaping the political landscape of the Balkans. The region reacts to these global processes in accordance with its own interests and capacities, which sometimes opens up space for controlled chaos used by some actors for strengthening their internal political position. This opens up a series of questions about whether the EU can integrate the Balkans fast enough to prevent the penetration of alternative geopolitical influences. In other words, the future of European security greatly depends on the political fate of the region.
The role of NATO is additionally complicating the regional dynamics. While Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Albania are integrated into the Alliance, Serbia maintains its policy of political neutrality, and Bosnia and Herzegovina remains in a state of fragmented advances. This opens up a series of questions about the security synchronization of the region, because different models of defense policies impact the total strategic planning of Europe. In other words, the Balkans is at the crossroads between the integrated security systems and national policies that are not mutually aligned.
The region will enter a period in which the European enlargement process and the resolution of national issues will be mutually conditioned. If the European Union does not renew the political will for the integration of the Western Balkans, the region might enter a state of long-term political fatigue, where unsolved issues could once again set the cycles of instability in motion. This opens up a series of questions about the ability of the EU to establish long-term mechanisms for the prevention of crises that would include economic reforms, institutional empowerment, resolution of identity disputes, and the modernization of the security sector. In other words, European security cannot be stable without a stable Balkans.
Regarding this, we could say that the region is entering into a phase of geopolitical competition, in which the internal resilience of institutions, the speed of European processes, and the ability to manage local crises will be the key factors. If these elements remain insufficiently developed, the Balkans could become a space in which the securitization of everyday life is deepened and in which the political stability depends on external monitoring, and not on functional democratic structures. This opens up a series of questions about the long-term sustainability of European security, because the Balkans remain the neuralgic point, and unresolved crises can have consequences that far surpass its own borders.
Authors: Miljan Petrović, Miloš Grozdanović