August 2025
After entering into confrontation with Israel during June 2025, which remains marked in the public media sources as the “12-days war”, Iran entered into a new phase of foreign policy that combines explicit military message with targeted diplomacy and strategic rationalization of risk tolerance, whereas Tehran is clearly striving towards affirming the deterrence ability, limiting direct escalation, and increase the political price for the opponents and their allies in the region at the same time. During a few series of exchange of fire after the initial Iranian attacks, it was visible that Tehran is using ballistic and UAV attacks to demonstrate technical ability and range, but also to test the threshold of Israeli and coalition defense systems; such approach is not impulsive, but represent an instrument Iran uses to reshape the regional balance, without setting in motion a total war.
In practice, Tehran is combining three parallel action channels: direct military activity focused on the ability of anti-aircraft defense and key infrastructure, intense support to the allies and the proxy forces throughout Levant and the Persian Gulf for the purpose of multiplying the pressure, and diplomatic efforts directed towards diminishing the international condemnation and maintaining the communication channels with the key actors, especially the countries of the Gulf, which have a higher threshold of tolerance for escalation. This multi-layered approach is exhibited in a series of attacks and responses that followed, while Iran still attempts to show that it cannot cause harm to strategic goals, countries of the region, and global powers rely on diplomatic and defense instruments to reduce the risk of conflict overspill.
Tehran’s strategic goal is double-sided: in short-term, the regime wishes to deter Israel and its allies from repeating the targeted actions within the Iranian sovereign space and raise the price of such operations; on mid-term, Iran is attempting to consolidate a higher regional position that would enable it to negotiate about conflict limitation from the position of force, at the same time nourishing a calculated provocation that tests geopolitical chains of reaction – how far will the US and their partners go in terms of direct participation, what would be the role of European political mechanisms in putting pressure on Tehran, and whether regional actors, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey, will establish the tolerance threshold that prevents further escalation.
The consequences to the regional balance develop through several mutually intertwined channels. First, the military dynamics: the conflict clearly showed the limitations and advantages of rocket attacks against the sophisticated anti-rocket defense systems, which incites regional forces to revise their doctrines and investments into defense technologies, logistics, and intelligence networks. Second, the political dynamics: countries of the region are now reorganizing their foreign policy by balancing between sovereign interests, economic pressures, and avoiding direct conflict, which means that the negotiation spaces will, in the near future, depend on bilateral engagements and direct security calculations but from universal multilateral platforms. Third, economic and energy channels: the fear of broader conflicts is affecting the energy flow and investment decisions, and thus the exporting and transit countries are actively working on the diversification and protection of critical infrastructure. These implications speak of the fact that the regional balance does not depend solely on military capacities, but also on the speed and efficiency of political and economic adjustments.
Tehran will most probably continue to apply the strategy of limited risk: it will maintain the capacities for mass attacks that can be used selectively, simultaneously strengthening the asymmetric networks and diplomatic ties that reduce the expenses of isolation. This means that the conflicts will remain limited in space and time, and the frequency and intensity of the tit-for-tat tactics will most probably be on the rise in the next trimesters, especially in phases when internal and foreign policy legitimacy in Tehran and Tel Aviv will be put to a test. In situations of escalation, Iran will also tend to avoid a direct conflict with nuclear or conventionally superior allies of Israel by spreading the conflict through proxy actors and hybrid threats against sensitive targets, at the same time imposing a veto on mechanisms that could economically isolate it.
However, this strategy also carries along some risks Tehran must manage: possible erosions of material capacities in a longer period if the escalation lasts, the growth of political and economic pressures from key partner states that do not wish for a destabilization of the region, and potential internal tensions if the public opinion and the economic elite assess that the cost of conflicting policies remain too high. Thus, managing these risks asks for a sophisticated combination of military deterrence, diplomatic offers, and economic compensations – aspects that will define the Iranian politics in the following period.
In conclusion, the twelve-day conflict with Israel has changed the parameters of the regional balance, given that the ability of Tehran to act between conventional and hybrid power, as well as the vulnerable balance of interests among the regional and global actors, are confirmed. Therefore, the following period asks fora n active risk management through diplomatic channels, modernization of defense capacities, and regional mechanisms that reduce the dangers of accidental or intentional escalations, whereas the ability of the countries to combine political and economic instruments with the instruments of deterrence will define the stability of the Persian Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean in the mid-term period.
Author: Tanja Kazić