October 2025
Bulgaria is entering the second half of 2025 in a phase in which energy stops being a technical issue and grows into a wider political story, and thus, we all understand that this country is attempting to rearrange its own security architecture through an energy transition that breaks up between its historical habits and the new geopolitical currents. Sofia has for years been living on coal and Russian energy sources, but now, it has to conduct decarbonization that will not endanger either social stability or energy security, which is already a field in which the analytical depth of the crisis attempts to dictate each discussion.
The Bulgarian energy sector no longer functions solely as a national dossier, because each of its moves is a national continuation of the European concept of resilience formed on the line between Brussels and Kyiv, while the Balkans, as such, still vibrates in its usual controlled chaos. Still, contrary to the majority of EU member states, which advance in a relatively unified rhythm, Bulgaria remains internally split between the fast green transition promoted by the pro-European actors and the realpolitik of those seeking slower steps so as not to shake up the local system, which, regarding this, is constantly creating tensions between ambitions and infrastructure.
By 2025, around 40% of Bulgarian electricity comes from coal exploited in the Maritsa Basin, while the nuclear energy from Kozloduy holds approximately 35% of total production. Solar and wind energy are gaining momentum, but they are still not able to withstand the base load during winter months, which is additionally complicating the story of securitization of everyday life, because when we are speaking of heating, each political compromise becomes part science and part bravery.
The social resistance is additionally slowing down the green transition: the syndicates and energy sector workers ask for a “righteous transition”, while the political center and the left warn of the “Brussels dictate” which, if conducted excessively, can collapse the social cohesion. Regarding this, I see that the economic arguments intertwine with political emotions, thus creating a situation in which each assessment turns into a fight for the future image of the country.
The Government adopted the National Plan for Energy and Climate Resilience (2024–2030), but the challenge in fact lies in its application: the administrative capacity is weak, local self-governments work without adequate technical knowledge, and the entire transition significantly depends on European funds and international financial institutions. Bulgaria thus enters the zone in which the operational problems are starting to shape the political reality.
The energy in Bulgaria is not only ecology and technology, but also the issue of geopolitical identity. Since 2022, the country has been seeking a fast alternative to Russian gas, relying on the Greek interconnector and the LNG capacities in Alexandroupolis, but it still depends on the Turkish gas infrastructure, which is creating a political risk, because Ankara is making the energy sector into an instrument that impacts the entire region.
At the same time, China emerges as the unexpected player in the market of solar panels and batteries. Companies such as Trina Solar and CATL offer affordable technologies, which sounds practical, but it causes concerns in Brussels over the new, potential “green dependency”. Regarding this, I see the European energy autonomy is breaking over the Bulgarian market, which is becoming the space of silent competition between the great powers.
Even though it lost its monopoly over the gas flow, Russia remains present through business networks, media channels, and actors who insist on the narrative of “social risks of the transition”. This is not only a political pressure, but also an attempt to slow down the European consolidation in the region, which is additionally complicating the Bulgarian position.
The economic calculation states that the complete replacement of coal by 2030 asks for more than ten billion euros, with the possibility of an increase of budget deficit by 1.5% GDP, and thus, the strategic circles are increasingly often now speaking of the “phase of stabilization”, a model in which green technologies are introduced gradually, while nuclear energy remains the main foundation.
In October 2025, Bulgaria stands before a choice between two equally significant priorities – energy security and climate sustainability. If it accelerates its investments into solar energy, modernizes its network, and develops storage systems, at the same time maintaining the nuclear power plant as a stable basis, it can profile itself as the regional leader of transition energy.
However, without strengthening institution, transparent public acquisitions, and firm coordination with Brussels, the risk from new social tensions remains high. In this sense, the transition becomes a test of maturity of the Bulgarian democracy, which must now show that it knows how to manage their own development between internal needs and European obligations, between sustainability and sovereignty, while in the back, politicized energy and geopolitical gravity constantly intertwine.
Author: Miljan Petrović