October 2025
The coup conducted on September 25, 2025, in Madagascar, in which the President Andry Rajoelina was overthrown, represents another hit to the fragile democratic transition of this island state. After a few months of growing tensions within the armed forces, the crises in supply with water and electricity, as well as the dissatisfaction with the economic decline, the rebelled military clique – led by Colonel Michael Randrianirina – took over the government, dissolved the Parliament, and suspended the Constitution, with a promise that a referendum will be held to establish democratic order.
The coup happened only a few years after Rajoelina attempted to consolidate power through constitutional reforms which, as the critics state, favored the presidential system and weakened the roles of institutions, with the final goal of dissolving the Parliament to prevent the opposition from ensuring the vote of no confidence in the President, and thus the tendencies that would lead to them asking his to step from the power. Madagascar, which witnessed four successful coups, including the one we witness today, as well as two failed coups (attempted in 2006 and 2010) since gaining independence in 1960, once again entered the political spiral, where military intervention is becoming a predictable mechanism of political course correction.
Therefore, the current coup is not a surprise, but a culmination of a long process of institutional retrograde. During the last three years, the political system of the country was characterized by a combination of economic decline, a growingly deep corruption, and the loss of trust in democratic processes. Moreover, it is indicative that African countries still nourish the “institution of a coup” as a modality of unconstitutional government overthrow, to which testifies the fast that the coup we record in Madagascar is already the tenth coup to occur on the continent in this decade, with which we position the issues of analysis and projection of the development of the situation in the field in the focus of researchers who deal with the phenomenon of political violence.
Namely, while analyzing the manner in which the state of risk of coups formed in Madagascar, as well as the triggers that led to the overthrow of the government in this way, it is indicative that the center of attention is the fact that Rajoelina attempted to balance between the international creditors and the local elites, and that the economic growth of od 2.3% in 2024 insufficient to reduce inflation and unemployment, while the rural population – which makes up for more than two-thirds of the population – continued to suffer from the consequences of the increase in prices of good and fuel. This created the conditions for the sliding of Madagascar into the state of risk of a coup.
On the political plan, the parliamentary opposition was marginalized, and the electoral process was deemed “partially free”. The emergence of the new civil movements, especially among the urban youth, represented a challenge to the government, but the military perceived this social unrest as proof that the “civilian government lost its legitimacy”. The previously mentioned urban youth, predominantly consisting of the members of Gen Z, set in motion a sort of “Digital revolution”, within which it, by outsmarting the local security forces, planned and organized protest activities via encrypted social platforms, among which Discord, TikTok, and Telegram come to the fore, thus absolutely marginalizing the existing political parties. With the primacy of the youth on the streets, in a political context, the conditions were created for a rebel military clique to step onto the stage, and finally, for the President to be deposed in a coup.
Colonel Randrianirina who, before the coup occurred, was the commander of the Army Corps of Personnel and Administrative and Technical Services (CAPSAT) of the Madagascar Armed Forces, a unit which, as a service in charge of human resources in the armed forces, always held some degree of political power in its hands, justified the military intervention as “national responsibility” and the need for “protecting the vital interests of the country”. His transitional government promised “the return to constitutional order” in the next 18 to 24 months, when a referendum will take place. However, the historical experience and scientific (lack of)grounding witnesses to the fact that similar promises in the past of Madagascar often grew into long-lasting military regimes, and that such cases in the previous period (but also nowadays – let us not forget the case of Mali!) did not surpass other countries suffering from coups as well.
The reactions of the international community and regional actors were fast, but not harmonized. The African Union suspended Madagascar’s membership and began consultations about possible sanctions. France, as the former colonial power and the key investor, expressed its “deep concerns”, at the same time leaving the diplomatic channels open, given its economic interests in the mining and energy sectors. Besides that, it is necessary to stress that France also took part in enabling the deposed president Andry Rajoelina to depart from the country, thus making it clear that, in this case, France is only attempting to adjust to the new situation in the field to maintain its interests in the country. China reacted pragmatically – by calling for “stability and the continuity in cooperation”, which was also the strategy used by the Russian Federation, while the US and the EU conditioned the provision of aid with a “clear transition plan”.
The instability in Madagascar has wider regional implications. South Africa and Mozambique are already expressing concerns that the wave of instability could endanger the coastal routes and regional market flows in the Indian Ocean. In the security context, Madagascar takes up a strategic position in the vicinity of important maritime lines that link Eastern Africa with the Middle East and Asia, because of which, on a regional level, it is insisted that the re-establishment of a stable security and political situation in the country. Besides that, the presence of international mining companies that exploit nickel, cobalt, and graphite gives this coup an additional geoeconomy dimension. The new regime is attempting to reassure investors that they will “respect all the contract obligations”, but there is also a general opinion that some interest groups linked to the army have already started re-examining their concession contracts signed during the time of the previous government.
The next two years will be decisive in the context of the future of Madagascar. In the best-case scenario – and exclusively within a scenario in which the military junta indeed organizes a referendum and establishes democratic government in a period no longer than 24 months – with international monitoring, the country could set foot on a path of institutional recovery. However, historical facts and the academic literacy signal to us that the scenario will not follow such a straight line, but that it would more probably be formalized in the form of a prolonged military government. The said scenario seems to be most possible, especially bearing in mind that contemporary coups – and the military juntas that in this way come to power, are usually followed by cleavages within the armed forces, as well as the resistance of the civilian society (which is, in this case, expected from the representatives of Gen Z!). Therefore, there is a big chance that the military regime, justifying itself with the prolonged instability in the country, will prolong the transition, thus establishing a formo f an “authoritarian stability”, but by no means democracy and absolutely not a real consolidation of the political and security situation in the country. In the end, in case of a dead-end prolongation of the rule of the military junta and negation of all democratic practices in Madagascar, we expect regional isolation, followed by the deepening of the economic crisis, which would be the result of introduction of sanctions by relevant international bodies (such as African Union, for example) and the drawback of international partners, thus additionally collapsing the economy and deepening the crisis in the society.
From all the previously stated, we can conclude that the September 2025 coup in Madagascar points to the fact that, in this country, resilient institutions able to “survive” political turbulences were nonexistent. While the international community is repeating the standard phrases about “the return to democracy”, it is clear that the essential challenge lies in redefining the relations between the military, politics, and society. Without serious investment in the reform of civil-military relations and the decentralization of power, Madagascar will still gravitate in the enchanted circle of instability.
Author: Tanja Kazić