October 2025
Local elections in Georgia at the beginning of October 2025 represent the key moment in the political DNA of the country and open up a series of questions about the future of democracy. Even though, formally speaking, mayors and members of local assemblies were electors, their significance surpasses the local level, given the fact that the night of the elections, besides the proclamation of the victor, was also followed by throwing of teargas, with which the police forces restrained the anti-government protests, in which we have also recorded the attempts of break-in into the Presidential Palace. In other words, the elections function as an indicator of the resilience of Georgia to internal, but also external stressors, including the pressure coming from Brussels and the permanent influence of Moscow.
In the last decade, Georgia positioned itself on the geopolitical line of tensions in Eurasia. The leading party, the Georgian Dream, insists on the sovereign path of development and the balanced foreign policy, with a tendency to pass from the phase of authoritarianism into the phase of totalitarianism, while the opposition and the civil sector warn that this is a step towards the model of controlled democracy. This opens up a series of questions about the virus of instability that could start spreading throughout institutions, and especially through the weakened judiciary system and the limited freedom of the press.
The political system of 2025 is characterized by a clear asymmetry of power. The Georgian Dream controls the institutions, the media, and a significant part of the economic flow. In other words, the formal dedication to the European path does not remove the inequality in the distribution of political influence. Local elections served as a test of the resilience of the opposition groups, and above all, the United National Movement and the Movement for the European Future of Georgia. Even though participation was about 54%, the international OSCE observers stressed the unequal conditions of campaigning, media bias, and abuse of administrative resources, but also a tendency of the opposition to boycott elections, which opens up a series of questions about social immunity and the integrity of elections.
The results show that the opposition is gradually becoming stronger in urban centers such as Tbilisi, Kutaisi, and Batumi. This opens up a series of questions about the growing cleavages between the urban pro-European-oriented population and the rural regions, where the state maintains strong influence through social programs. The analytical depth of the crisis is becoming visible through the engagement of young voters and independent candidates who position themselves outside the traditional party system. Their campaign, focused on transparency, digital administration, and the fight against corruption, shows the new wave of political awareness.
Still, the institutional weakness and media polarization limit their influence. The Georgian society remains divided along generational and regional lines; the older generations and the rural population are more prone to conservative narratives, while the urban and educated parts of the society insist on transparency and responsibility of the government. This opens up a series of questions regarding the ability of the social immunity to sustain the pressures from outside and within.
Georgian foreign policy remains ambivalent. On the eve of the elections, the EU conditionally confirmed to Georgia its status of a candidate state for EU membership, and the Government in Tbilisi promised reforms in the judiciary and the media. In practice, still, these steps are limited, which opens up a series of questions about the efficiency of the European monitoring and integration. Russia continues to implement its strategy of “soft penetration” through economic ties and cultural diplomacy, while the US is redirecting its focus onto the East Mediterranean and the Middle East, which enables the growth of Chinese influence through infrastructural projects of the “Belt and Road” initiative. In other words, the balance between external expansion and internal instability remains a fragile network of the political DNA.
The outcome of local elections shows that democracy is alive, but not stable. The institutions function within the framework of limited pluralism. This opens up a series of questions about the scenarios that follow: incremental democratization through strengthening of the civil society, consolidation of the controlled regime, or a political crisis in the form of mass protests, in case of amendment of the electoral law or forbidding independent media. In other words, the survival of democracy depends on the readiness of the elites to accept political competition as a norm.
For the international community, Georgia remains an indicator of the ability of the European enlargement policy to support democratic consolidation under external pressures. This opens up a series of questions regarding the EU’s capacity to effectively combine monitoring, support, and political pressure, while the 2025 local elections serve as the most significant test of the endurance of democratic processes in the country.
Author: Miloš Grozdanović