January 2026
The last decade brought along a gradual, but essential change in the architecture of security in Southeastern Europe. Besides state military and police structures, new actors entered the scene – private security companies (PSC), whose growth is incited by a combination of political transition, economic insecurity, and regional security vacuums. While up to several years ago, the PSCs were usually connected to infrastructural objects and physical security, nowadays, they take an active participation in providing intelligence support, cybersecurity, monitoring critical energy infrastructure, and even in crisis management operations.
The war in Ukraine and the escalation of tensions in the Middle East accelerated the transformation of the security market in the region. The Balkans, as a space between the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security belt, has become a laboratory for examining the models of cooperation between state institutions and private security actors. However, this cooperation also carries along serious risks – from regulational grey zones and political corruption, to the possibility of the instrumentalization of private companies in political and intelligence purposes.
Private security companies in Southeastern Europe act in conditions of high institutional risk and legal ambiguity. In countries such as Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia, the legal framework that defines the actions of private security subjects remains fragmented and quite outdated. At the same time, the growing number of tenders for security state objects and critical infrastructure opens up a space for new types of political and security influence. Companies close to some political circles get key contracts, wihch positions them not only as commercial, but also as parainstitutional instruments of power.
In Montenegro and Albania, the PSCs began to enter the sectors of tourism, energy, and naval security, often with support from foreign partners from Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. Turkish companies, such as the SADAT International Defense Consultancy, have shown interest in training local structures, while some American and British companies are focused on cyber protection and counter-hybrid capacities, within the NATO program of assistance to partner countries.
On the other hand, the Russian influence manifests through indirect financing or consulting, especially in Serbia and the Republic of Srpska, where some countries act as “technical partners“ in the projects of protection of energy infrastructure, while, in fact, they function as an instrument for intelligence gathering.
The tenders for security services are increasingly often becoming politically sensitive instruments that can impact the balance of internal influences. Private companies with good connections in the governments of the region gain access to data, technologies, and contracts that surpass commercial frameworks.
The tender systems thus become the channel for geopolitical projection of power: the Western partners offer monitoring software and cyber-domain training, while the eastern partners offer “flexible models” that mix security, infrastructure, and energy. In this context, private military companies are not only the suppliers of services anymore, but agents of foreign influences that act through economic mechanisms.
One of the key challenges in the years to come will be the establishment of a regional regulation framework that would clearly define licensing, training, control, and responsibility of PSCs. The European Union, in the context of accession negotiations with the countries of the Western Balkans, is more and more stressing the need for harmonization with the directives of arms and training control, as well as the need for transparency in public procurement.
Without this, the risk of parastate structures and overspill of private capacities into the grey zones of intelligence actions remains high. Even now, the Balkans is showing some signs of “security privatization”, where some actors are using security companies as a cover for political and economic goals.
By 2026, the private security companies have become an unavoidable element of the regional security landscape. Their role is no longer marginal – they form economic flows, political relations, and the level of state sovereignty in the field of security. It is not the question of whether countries will cooperate with them anymore, but under what conditions and for whose interest.
For the countries of Southeastern Europe, controlled integration of private actors into the national security system represents a test of institutional maturity. If this process remains in the domain of informal contracts and political tenders, the region is at risk of becoming the space of parallel security structures. But if it is used as a chance for professionalization and transparency, the private sector might become a resource of stability and integration into the European security framework.
Author: Miljan Petrović