April 2025
Looking from the perspective of the beginning of 2025, three countries of Western and Eastern Africa – Mali, Guinea, and the Sudan – nowadays represent a classical paradigm of what contemporary analysts are calling the “post-chaotic states”: political systems that function without full Statehood, but still manage to survive in the conditions of crises. In each of these countries, the dissolution of the old order did not lead to stability, but to the creation of the state of permanent institutional ambivalence. However, in such politically and security-challenged climates, new forms of power, management, and legitimacy are emerging on the African continent, existing outside the classical state structures.
While we are witnessing a sort of “retreat” of the West, especially in France, as well as the loss of credibility of regional African organizations, such as ECOWAS and the African Union, the reconstruction processes of these institutions are becoming increasingly localized, unpredictable, and fragmented. There is no question anymore about how to “regain the power of the state”, but how to build new institutions that will function in the conditions of permanent instability.
Four years after a coup took place in the country (in 2021) and the consequent gradual drawback of the French forces, Mali remains under the control of the military junta, which, in the end of April 2025, gained the support of the political elites to keep the leader of the military junta, Assimi Goïta, as the President until 2030, thus ensuring the “stability” of the state. However, the territorial integrity of this country is increasingly being lost in the fragmentation between the South, dominated by the Government in Bamako, and the North, controlled by the Touareg groups and Islamist militias, and thus the efforts put into maintaining “stability” in the country instantly fall short.
The reconstruction of institutions in Mali is not conducted through classical centralization, but through local adaptation of power. Regional communities – especially in Gao and Timbuktu- are developing their own governing mechanisms, often with informal agreements with local leadership, tribal councils, and representatives of the military junta. This, in fact, is the new model of the “fragmented Statehood”, in which the institutions are no longer founded on the monopoly of force, but on the negotiation leverage of local actors.
Exactly this model, as informal as it seems, in the last several years has resulted in the form of limited peace and de-escalation of violence in the country, manifested in the form of attacks against the local population. In this way, we can rightfully state that Mali has become a laboratory for “hybrid stability“, in which the military junta acts as an interlocutor between the local groups, and not as a classical Government.
On the other hand, Guinea represents a different type of crisis: the crisis of institutional legitimacy. After the coup of 2021 and the failed organization of elections, and finally the dismissal of the Government in February 2024, the country entered a stable phase of “controlled transition” under the leadership of the military junta. However, what singles out Guinea as a unique case in the African continent is the attempt at an institutional renewal through the establishment of technocracy.
Namely, under the pressure of international institutions and due to the existence of an increasing need for stability, the military junta has, after dismissing the Government, formed in the second half of 2024 a technical cabinet for the reform of the state administration – a structure which, for the first time, includes the diaspora, but university professors and experts in the field of political system as well, into the decision-making process. Even though the political liberalization is not the priority at this moment, this institutional experiment in Guinea shows that there is an alternative between authoritarianism and anarchy, projected in the form of technocratic stability. The question remains whether this model will survive after the first democratic presidential elections, scheduled for the end of 2025, or whether the cycle of military domination and the rule of military juntas begins again.
In the end, Sudan remains the most dramatic example of an institutional collapse in contemporary Africa. The civil war, in which, since 2023, the Sudan Armed Forces have been clashing with the Rapid Support Forces – RSF, has destroyed the state apparatus and infrastructure and caused the displacement of more than 11 million people. Still, exactly in the ruins of the formal state, some new forms of social resilience begin to form.
In some parts of Khartoum, as well as in Darfur, local communities have begun establishing committees for the governing and humanitarian support – civilian structures that function as parallel institutions. These committees coordinate supply, mediation, and local security, thus taking up the role of state organs. Even though they currently do not possess formal resources, they represent a spark of the potential bottom-up reconstruction, starting from the idea that stability does not have to come from the center, but can emerge from the network of local initiatives that can institutionalize in time.
Therefore, Mali, Guinea, and Sudan point to the fact that the institution reconstruction process after a period of political and security chaos no longer follows the Western patterns of transition. Instead of the “coup-elections-democracy” linear model, the African states are increasingly adopting the models of adaptive statehood: Institutions are not recaptured, but “reinvented”.
The key challenge in these cases is, in fact, the issue of legitimacy. Namely, while foreign actors insist on constitutional processes and elections, the internal actors often prefer functional stability compared to formal democracy. Exactly this misbalance explains why “democratization” in the African continent is no longer a “magical formula”, but a sort of political risk.
Today, it is becoming clear that the African continent is stepping into a new phase of institutional realism. The countries such as Mali, Guinea, and Sudan do not strive towards recapturing the old order, because the old order in each country individually was overthrown for a reason! -, but are establishing survival balances: minimal functionality which enables energy, security, and administrative control, without complete centralization. Such a model is not democratic in the classical sense of the word, but it is sustainable in the context of chronic conflicts. In this sense, African countries, after living in the state of chaos, are becoming exquisite laboratories of the future statehood – not the one based on sovereignty, but on abilities; not on elections, but on resilience.
Author: Tanja Kazić
April 2025
Looking from the perspective of the beginning of 2025, three countries of Western and Eastern Africa – Mali, Guinea, and the Sudan – nowadays represent a classical paradigm of what contemporary analysts are calling the “post-chaotic states”: political systems that function without full Statehood, but still manage to survive in the conditions of crises. In each of these countries, the dissolution of the old order did not lead to stability, but to the creation of the state of permanent institutional ambivalence. However, in such politically and security-challenged climates, new forms of power, management, and legitimacy are emerging on the African continent, existing outside the classical state structures.
While we are witnessing a sort of “retreat” of the West, especially in France, as well as the loss of credibility of regional African organizations, such as ECOWAS and the African Union, the reconstruction processes of these institutions are becoming increasingly localized, unpredictable, and fragmented. There is no question anymore about how to “regain the power of the state”, but how to build new institutions that will function in the conditions of permanent instability.
Four years after a coup took place in the country (in 2021) and the consequent gradual drawback of the French forces, Mali remains under the control of the military junta, which, in the end of April 2025, gained the support of the political elites to keep the leader of the military junta, Assimi Goïta, as the President until 2030, thus ensuring the “stability” of the state. However, the territorial integrity of this country is increasingly being lost in the fragmentation between the South, dominated by the Government in Bamako, and the North, controlled by the Touareg groups and Islamist militias, and thus the efforts put into maintaining “stability” in the country instantly fall short.
The reconstruction of institutions in Mali is not conducted through classical centralization, but through local adaptation of power. Regional communities – especially in Gao and Timbuktu- are developing their own governing mechanisms, often with informal agreements with local leadership, tribal councils, and representatives of the military junta. This, in fact, is the new model of the “fragmented Statehood”, in which the institutions are no longer founded on the monopoly of force, but on the negotiation leverage of local actors.
Exactly this model, as informal as it seems, in the last several years has resulted in the form of limited peace and de-escalation of violence in the country, manifested in the form of attacks against the local population. In this way, we can rightfully state that Mali has become a laboratory for “hybrid stability“, in which the military junta acts as an interlocutor between the local groups, and not as a classical Government.
On the other hand, Guinea represents a different type of crisis: the crisis of institutional legitimacy. After the coup of 2021 and the failed organization of elections, and finally the dismissal of the Government in February 2024, the country entered a stable phase of “controlled transition” under the leadership of the military junta. However, what singles out Guinea as a unique case in the African continent is the attempt at an institutional renewal through the establishment of technocracy.
Namely, under the pressure of international institutions and due to the existence of an increasing need for stability, the military junta has, after dismissing the Government, formed in the second half of 2024 a technical cabinet for the reform of the state administration – a structure which, for the first time, includes the diaspora, but university professors and experts in the field of political system as well, into the decision-making process. Even though the political liberalization is not the priority at this moment, this institutional experiment in Guinea shows that there is an alternative between authoritarianism and anarchy, projected in the form of technocratic stability. The question remains whether this model will survive after the first democratic presidential elections, scheduled for the end of 2025, or whether the cycle of military domination and the rule of military juntas begins again.
In the end, Sudan remains the most dramatic example of an institutional collapse in contemporary Africa. The civil war, in which, since 2023, the Sudan Armed Forces have been clashing with the Rapid Support Forces – RSF, has destroyed the state apparatus and infrastructure and caused the displacement of more than 11 million people. Still, exactly in the ruins of the formal state, some new forms of social resilience begin to form.
In some parts of Khartoum, as well as in Darfur, local communities have begun establishing committees for the governing and humanitarian support – civilian structures that function as parallel institutions. These committees coordinate supply, mediation, and local security, thus taking up the role of state organs. Even though they currently do not possess formal resources, they represent a spark of the potential bottom-up reconstruction, starting from the idea that stability does not have to come from the center, but can emerge from the network of local initiatives that can institutionalize in time.
Therefore, Mali, Guinea, and Sudan point to the fact that the institution reconstruction process after a period of political and security chaos no longer follows the Western patterns of transition. Instead of the “coup-elections-democracy” linear model, the African states are increasingly adopting the models of adaptive statehood: Institutions are not recaptured, but “reinvented”.
The key challenge in these cases is, in fact, the issue of legitimacy. Namely, while foreign actors insist on constitutional processes and elections, the internal actors often prefer functional stability compared to formal democracy. Exactly this misbalance explains why “democratization” in the African continent is no longer a “magical formula”, but a sort of political risk.
Today, it is becoming clear that the African continent is stepping into a new phase of institutional realism. The countries such as Mali, Guinea, and Sudan do not strive towards recapturing the old order, because the old order in each country individually was overthrown for a reason! -, but are establishing survival balances: minimal functionality which enables energy, security, and administrative control, without complete centralization. Such a model is not democratic in the classical sense of the word, but it is sustainable in the context of chronic conflicts. In this sense, African countries, after living in the state of chaos, are becoming exquisite laboratories of the future statehood – not the one based on sovereignty, but on abilities; not on elections, but on resilience.
Author: Tanja Kazić
April 2025
Looking from the perspective of the beginning of 2025, three countries of Western and Eastern Africa – Mali, Guinea, and the Sudan – nowadays represent a classical paradigm of what contemporary analysts are calling the “post-chaotic states”: political systems that function without full Statehood, but still manage to survive in the conditions of crises. In each of these countries, the dissolution of the old order did not lead to stability, but to the creation of the state of permanent institutional ambivalence. However, in such politically and security-challenged climates, new forms of power, management, and legitimacy are emerging on the African continent, existing outside the classical state structures.
While we are witnessing a sort of “retreat” of the West, especially in France, as well as the loss of credibility of regional African organizations, such as ECOWAS and the African Union, the reconstruction processes of these institutions are becoming increasingly localized, unpredictable, and fragmented. There is no question anymore about how to “regain the power of the state”, but how to build new institutions that will function in the conditions of permanent instability.
Four years after a coup took place in the country (in 2021) and the consequent gradual drawback of the French forces, Mali remains under the control of the military junta, which, in the end of April 2025, gained the support of the political elites to keep the leader of the military junta, Assimi Goïta, as the President until 2030, thus ensuring the “stability” of the state. However, the territorial integrity of this country is increasingly being lost in the fragmentation between the South, dominated by the Government in Bamako, and the North, controlled by the Touareg groups and Islamist militias, and thus the efforts put into maintaining “stability” in the country instantly fall short.
The reconstruction of institutions in Mali is not conducted through classical centralization, but through local adaptation of power. Regional communities – especially in Gao and Timbuktu- are developing their own governing mechanisms, often with informal agreements with local leadership, tribal councils, and representatives of the military junta. This, in fact, is the new model of the “fragmented Statehood”, in which the institutions are no longer founded on the monopoly of force, but on the negotiation leverage of local actors.
Exactly this model, as informal as it seems, in the last several years has resulted in the form of limited peace and de-escalation of violence in the country, manifested in the form of attacks against the local population. In this way, we can rightfully state that Mali has become a laboratory for “hybrid stability“, in which the military junta acts as an interlocutor between the local groups, and not as a classical Government.
On the other hand, Guinea represents a different type of crisis: the crisis of institutional legitimacy. After the coup of 2021 and the failed organization of elections, and finally the dismissal of the Government in February 2024, the country entered a stable phase of “controlled transition” under the leadership of the military junta. However, what singles out Guinea as a unique case in the African continent is the attempt at an institutional renewal through the establishment of technocracy.
Namely, under the pressure of international institutions and due to the existence of an increasing need for stability, the military junta has, after dismissing the Government, formed in the second half of 2024 a technical cabinet for the reform of the state administration – a structure which, for the first time, includes the diaspora, but university professors and experts in the field of political system as well, into the decision-making process. Even though the political liberalization is not the priority at this moment, this institutional experiment in Guinea shows that there is an alternative between authoritarianism and anarchy, projected in the form of technocratic stability. The question remains whether this model will survive after the first democratic presidential elections, scheduled for the end of 2025, or whether the cycle of military domination and the rule of military juntas begins again.
In the end, Sudan remains the most dramatic example of an institutional collapse in contemporary Africa. The civil war, in which, since 2023, the Sudan Armed Forces have been clashing with the Rapid Support Forces – RSF, has destroyed the state apparatus and infrastructure and caused the displacement of more than 11 million people. Still, exactly in the ruins of the formal state, some new forms of social resilience begin to form.
In some parts of Khartoum, as well as in Darfur, local communities have begun establishing committees for the governing and humanitarian support – civilian structures that function as parallel institutions. These committees coordinate supply, mediation, and local security, thus taking up the role of state organs. Even though they currently do not possess formal resources, they represent a spark of the potential bottom-up reconstruction, starting from the idea that stability does not have to come from the center, but can emerge from the network of local initiatives that can institutionalize in time.
Therefore, Mali, Guinea, and Sudan point to the fact that the institution reconstruction process after a period of political and security chaos no longer follows the Western patterns of transition. Instead of the “coup-elections-democracy” linear model, the African states are increasingly adopting the models of adaptive statehood: Institutions are not recaptured, but “reinvented”.
The key challenge in these cases is, in fact, the issue of legitimacy. Namely, while foreign actors insist on constitutional processes and elections, the internal actors often prefer functional stability compared to formal democracy. Exactly this misbalance explains why “democratization” in the African continent is no longer a “magical formula”, but a sort of political risk.
Today, it is becoming clear that the African continent is stepping into a new phase of institutional realism. The countries such as Mali, Guinea, and Sudan do not strive towards recapturing the old order, because the old order in each country individually was overthrown for a reason! -, but are establishing survival balances: minimal functionality which enables energy, security, and administrative control, without complete centralization. Such a model is not democratic in the classical sense of the word, but it is sustainable in the context of chronic conflicts. In this sense, African countries, after living in the state of chaos, are becoming exquisite laboratories of the future statehood – not the one based on sovereignty, but on abilities; not on elections, but on resilience.
Author: Tanja Kazić