April 2025
At the beginning of the 2020s, Africa became the central battlefield of the new fight for energy resources. While the world is entering a new phase of transition to “Green” economies, the African continent, rich in lithium, cobalt, copper, and gold, is gaining significance not felt since colonialism and the post-colonial scramble. However, behind diplomatic, investment forums, and infrastructure projects lies the fight for a political stronghold. Namely, China, the United States of America, and the rich Arab monarchies are not investing exclusively into mines – they are also investing into institutions, security agreements, and finally, into a long-term dependence of African countries on foreign partners.
The Chinese model of influence in the African mining zones remains the most consistent and comprehensive. Namely, for many years now, Beijing has been working on constructing a system based on exchange and resource infrastructure, within which countries such as DR Congo, Zambia, and Mozambique were offered road, hydro power plants, and port reconstruction in exchange for the exploitation of the mineral wealth of these countries. Until 2025, more than 40% of Chinese direct investments in the territories of African countries refer to the energy and mining sectors. For example, in the DR Congo, China Molybdenum Company controls more than half of the total cobalt production, while in Zimbabwe, China took over all major projects of lithium mining.
The key advantage of the Chinese approach lies in its longevity: loans and investments are not based on the market dynamics, but on political relations. This dependence makes it difficult for countries to revise their contracts or impose environmental standards, which gradually leads to the loss of regulatory sovereignty. In this way, Beijing succeeded in transforming the mining zones into geopolitical enclaves – spaces in which not only ores are exploited, but diplomatic positions are shaped as well.
On the other side, for a long time, Washington ignored African resources as a category of strategic significance, but the war in Ukraine and the increase in global energy instability significantly changed this perspective. Namely, since 2023, the US Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and USAID directed new funds towards initiatives that link energy transition and security cooperation. For example, in Niger, Mali, and Ghana, American projects refer not only to the exploration of mining reserves, but also to the construction of processing facilities and the training of the local security forces to ensure protection of their mining concessions.
This model – often called “security capitalism” – has a double function: reduction of risk from new coups that would indisputably threaten the existing investments, but also empowering local governments perceived by Washington as “democratic partners”. However, the American strategy is at the same time also the slowest in execution: administrative procedures and conditioning with transparency are quite often deterring the local elites, who cherish more the speed, but also the discretion of the Chinese model.
As a third option and a sort of a balance between the “East” and the “West”, the Gulf countries come into play, and especially Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. Namely, in the last three years, these countries have become unexpectedly strong actors in the African mining sector. Contrary to China and the US, they do not strive towards strategic dominance, but exclusively towards diversification of their own energy portfolios and geopolitical branding, which makes them “suitable” partners of African countries.
For example, funds such as the Saudi Mining Investment Fund from Saudi Arabia, as well as Mubadala from the UAE, invest in gold, copper, and rare minerals in the Sudan, Eritrea, and Tanzania, linking these investments with broader infrastructure and agricultural projects. In this way, the Arab countries are not only ensuring access to resources, but they are at the same time constructing logistical chains that are speedily bringing Africa closer to the Middle Eastern markets. Therefore, the Arab investments, in fact, act as a sort of a balance between the Chinese domination and the Western regulation, offering African countries a “third option” – financial support without political conditions, with clear geo-economic revenue.
Therefore, in 2025, Africa is no longer just a space of resource exploitation, but has become an important geostrategic laboratory in which the twenty-first-century models of power are tested: the Chinese state capitalism, American security interventionism, and Arab investment pragmatism. The future of the Arab mining zones will depend on the ability of the local actors to construct their own institutional mechanisms of control – not only over resources, but also over forms of foreign dependence. If the current trend continues, the continent could become the key leverage of the new energy order, but also the space where decisions will be made regarding the relations between advancement and dependence. In this fight, Africa is no longer just a spectator, but it has become a stage in which every foreign investor must accept the new reality – that the African resources are no longer just a mere “gift of nature”, but have become an instrument of geopolitical choice.
Author: Tanja Kazić