April 2025
In the post-Ukrainian geopolitics and energy relocation of power in the wider Euro-Asian region, the Balkans are increasingly often escaping the old binary division between the East and the West. Today, it stands as a bridge between new security paradigms and alternative energy flows entering Europe from the Caspian Sea region. In this context, Azerbaijan and Turkey are being profiled as two key strategic nodes – not solely as suppliers and energy transit countries, but also as holders of the new security logics in the region.
According to the data from 2024, more than 12.9 billion cubic meters of gas that enter Southeastern Europe arrive via TANAP–TAP corridor, starting from Sangachal (Azerbaijan), with the main transit artery passing through Anatolia (Turkey). In combination with the growing political and defense cooperation of Baku and Ankara, this energy infrastructure is becoming the means of geopolitical influence, at the same time ensuring stability in the region.
The policies of Azerbaijan in the last five years show an increasing moderation directed towards strengthening its role in supplying Europe with energy independent from the Russian infrastructure. Besides long-term contracts with the EU, Baku intensified in 2024 its bilateral relations with Serbia, Bulgaria, and Hungary, thus bridging the old gap between the South Gas Corridor and the Central Balkan states.
However, the value of Azerbaijan does not lie exclusively in its export capacities. Its security agreement with Turkey, under the auspices of the Organization of Turkic States, shows potential for exerting influence in terms of protection of energy infrastructure, as well as reacting to hybrid threats that are increasingly often targeting critical points of pipelines in the Balkans.
Turkey positions itself not only as a transit territory, but also as an “energy hub” that models the price, dynamics, and security of energy delivery into Southeastern Europe. The Turkish Energy Center project in Thrace, whose construction is being finalized in the spring of 2025, points to the intention of Ankara to take over the role of the regulator of the regional energy market.
Moreover, Turkey is strengthening its role through the initiative for the energy diplomacy of the Balkans – a mechanism uniting the countries of the Western Balkans, South Caucasus, and Central Asia in the form of informal consultations and strategic dialogue. At the same time, with increasingly tense relations with the EU, Ankara is widening its cooperation with the countries that are not members of the Union, but have ambitions of energy transit integration, such as Serbia and North Macedonia.
While Russia is losing a part of its energy influence in the Balkans, there is a growing need for new mechanisms of collective energy security. In this context, the cooperation with Azerbaijan and Turkey is no longer an issue of energy trade, but also a key element of regional stability.
If the Balkans wish to construct a sustainable system of energy and security resilience, it will have to define its role in this Caspian-Anatolian energy system. This implies improvement of monitoring, digital security, and strategic planning capacities. The role of Azerbaijan and Turkey as pillars of this system can end up being pivotal – not only energy-wise, but also as a guarantor of long-term political balance in the Balkans.
Authors: dr Violeta Rašković Talović, Tanja Kazić