October 2025
The last decade brought along the accelerated entrance of China into the Balkans, with a pattern that resembles a carefully programmed operation. This region, traditionally linked to the influences of EU, Russia, and Turkey, has become a testing environment for the Chinese “encryption of power” – a mixture of capital, infrastructure, and political flexibility that fits the wider framework of the Belt and Road initiative. China sets here its algorithms of influence, by combining investments, loans, and technical arrangements into a system that reshapes local policies, without formal interference with the sovereignty. In practice, this is a new form of the “politics of algorithm”, where the capital defines the architecture of decisions.
For Beijing, the Balkans represent a bridge towards Europe, but also a laboratory. The model of cooperation without direct political conditioning functions as a technical protocol – simple on the outside, but complex on the inside. The Chinese companies are present in the key points of infrastructure, energy, and telecommunications. From Piraeus to Danube, a network is established, resembling an optimized version of digital sovereignty which, in reality, creates new dependence.
The Chinese interest in the Balkans rests on three parameters. The first one is the access to the market and corridors. The second implies generation of political support within European framework. The third one implies testing alternative models of cooperation, which differ from Western standards. The investments surpass 15 billion euros. Projects are big –Belgrade-Budapest fast track, Kostolac B3, Bar–Boljare highway, and Piraeus as the focal point of the Chinese logistical network. These projects act as firmly coordinated points in the spreading system.
Even though China formally insists on the non-competitiveness principle, loans often appear with clauses that increase long-term dependence. The “indebt yourself and build” model functions as a software license – without any obligation of political loyalty, but with implicit limitations that manage the partner’s behavior long-term.
Geopolitically speaking, the Balkans is the nodal point. For China, it is an extension of the economic expansion and a political support in Europe. The countries outside the EU are especially significant, since they offer lesser regulatory limitations. This is where China uses three instruments: the infrastructural capital, technological platforms (5G, monitoring systems), and a narrative about the partnership between sovereign states. This approach suits the political elites which wish to balance between bigger powers without an open conflict.
Serbia is the central partner in this system. More than 40 agreements were signed, including the Free Trade Agreement from 2024. This positions Serbia as the focal node of the Chinese network in the Southeastern Europe, functionally similar to the server hub in a bigger digital system.
The Chinese presence is causing reactions. The EU is attempting to limit the entrance of the Chinese capital in strategic sectors. The new instruments, such as the Global Gateway and European investment plans, represent an attempt at creation of a competitive environment. Still, China remains faster and more flexible. The US warns of erosion of Western structures and stress the risk of technological dependence, especially in the fields of monitoring and telecommunications. But the Balkan governments choose pragmatism. For them, China is an economic opportunity, and not an ideological threat. This enables the actions to take place in the so-called “grey zone” – between formal partnerships and hidden dependencies.
By 2025, the Chinese activities shifted towards green technologies, energy sector, and digital infrastructure. Solar facilities, battery production plants, and systems of digital networks impact the formation of the new energy map of the region. The Chinese investments, thus, enter the space which directly impacts the digital sovereignty of countries – the question that will be more important that classical infrastructure in the future.
The risks remain clear. Excessive ineptness can destabilize smaller economies. The pressures coming from the EU or the US might increase. The mistrust towards Chinese technologies in the security sector might cause new tensions. But China continues to use the benefits of long-term planning. Its strategy does not ask for open domination. It quietly relies on entrenchment through the network of capital, technology, and institutional cooperation.
For the Balkans, the key challenge is not to choose a side. The challenge is the ability to define one’s own interests in the environment in which the great powers use different forms of the encryption of power. Without a strategy of economic resilience and clear management of technological risks, the region risks being more processed than sovereign, more an object of algorithmic politics than its creator.
Author: Aleksandar Stanković