July 2025
The Black Sea region and the Caucasus remain one of the key hubs of European and Eurasian security, a space in which the historical deposits and contemporary strategic ambitions intertwine with deep socio-political patterns that generate a complex regional resilience. As the West and Russia continue their long-term redistribution of resources within the extended competition, this region is more and more clearly functioning in the state of an extended strategic limbo – between frozen conflicts, controlled tensions, and the constant possibility of a sudden, unwanted escalation.
The dynamics of instability are simultaneously being shaped by several processes. The militarization of the Black Sea accelerates as the years pass by, while the security architecture of the South Caucasus is gradually collapsing under the burden of the post-Ukrainian changes. In parallel, the renewed ethnic and territorial tensions in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the eastern territories of Azerbaijan in the last few years have created a continued seismic pressure under the already burdened geopolitical construction. With this, a space opens for new modalities of rivalry, at the same time proportionally increasing the risk that the tactical incident might turn into a strategic problem.
The Black Sea remains the central energy and security center of gravity. Russia, after the modernization of naval capacities conducted between 2022 and 2024, maintains a stable and effective presence in the eastern part of the basin, relying on the combination of modernized platforms and integrated anti-ship systems. Such a configuration enables Moscow to maintain the ability of strategic deterrence and efficient control over communication lines, despite the increasingly pronounced attempts of the West to redefine the balance of power in the region through NATO. At the same time, Ukraine, with intense technical and intelligence support of the Alliance, is accelerating the modernization of the coastal capacities, while during July 2025, the scope of joint patrols with Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria was additionally increased. Even though these activities are presented as mechanisms of protection of naval corridors, their real function is increasingly resembling the creation of a long-term structure of deterrence, intended for limiting the Russian maneuver space, without the need for confrontation.
In such an environment, the risk from tactical incidents becomes an unavoidable side effect. Close maneuvers of vessels in the vicinity of the territorial waters of NATO states, as well as the Ukrainian anti-drone and rocket drills, are reproducing the trigger-response dynamic logic that is characteristic of the Cold War late phase, but now additionally burdened with the presence of drones on the battlefields and information saturation. Each move of one side automatically creates the need for the response of the other, thus continually narrowing the margin of error.
In the South Caucasus region, new processes are opening that are increasingly strongly maintaining the changed regional architecture. The Russian military presence, even though it is still a stabilizing factor, no longer guarantees complete amortization of local tensions. The demographic pressures, economic asymmetries, and the growing ambitions of Turkey and Iran are creating a new strategic environment in which Nagorno-Karabakh, despite the formal consolidation of Azerbaijani control, remains a sensitive spot. Turkey and Iran are constructing their roles carefully, using technological means, bilateral arrangements, and the emerging political and security architecture to strengthen their position that no longer lies exclusively on Russian security guarantees.
Georgia is in the position of a state that balances between its Euro-Atlantic aspirations and the imperative of preventing escalation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The local actor, closely aligned with Moscow, are maintaining their capacities for fast mobilization, which makes these regions function as mechanisms of strategic signaling, and not as static frozen conflicts. They represent flexible instruments through which Russia calibrates the level of stability in the region, without the need for direct and comprehensive intervention.
During 2025, the region entered a new phase in which it no longer relies on a simple security balance defined by Russian super-ability, but on a more complex structure in which Turkey and Azerbaijan tend to widen their own influences. Investing in infrastructure of fast mobilization, integration of drone and anti-drone technologies into mountain and coastal systems, as well as a gradual training of local structures, are becoming the key elements of the new regional strategy. Even though these processes do not present an open challenge to Moscow, they clearly show the intention to construct a more autonomous security architecture in which the Western and Turkish-Azerbaijani interests are gaining a firmer operational basis.
From 2025 to 2026, the region will most likely remain trapped in the state of heightened tension, with periodical incidents that will not grow into a wider escalation. The Black Sea and the Caucasus will continue to function as laboratories of multipolar calculations, where not a single actor will have an interest in starting an open war, but each will tend to form the rules of the future architecture of power. Russia will attempt to maintain the strategic rhythm of the region through the combination of presence, deterrence, and controlled pressure, while the West and the regional actors will continue to spread their capacity for action within this increasingly fragmented security landscape.
In such an ambiance, the outcome will not be determined by one event, but by an accumulation of small shifts and long-term competition for the position in the space which stability remains delicate, but where geostrategic value rests unquestionably.
Authors: dr Violeta Rašković Talović, Tanja Kazić