July 2025
In the last decade, Iran has gradually constructed its position as the most consistent actor in the Middle East. While the United States of America gradually reduced its military presence, and Russia focused on the war in Ukraine and internal economic priorities, Tehran has methodically spread its influence through a combination of military, religious, intelligence, and economic instruments. Until mid-2025, Iran fortified its position as the key actor in Syria and Iraq – not only as the axis of resistance against Western influence, but also as an architect of its own regional system of security.
This research analyses mechanisms and consequences of the Iranian projection of power in two states that represent a geostrategic bridge between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. While in Syria, Iran acts within the multipolar architecture under Russian and Turkish influence, in Iraq, its strategy is gaining the form of a deep institutional and security integration.
A decade after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, Iran has turned its military engagement into a political and economic influence that no longer relies exclusively on the power of militias. During the last months of Bashar al-Assad’s rule, Tehran planned to deepen cooperation with the Syrian Ministry of Defense by signing an accord on “military reconstruction,” referring to staff training, modernization of the communication structure, and integration of unmanned aerial systems into the Syrian army. However, in the post-Assad government era, and with the Ministry of Defense now headed by the former leader of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) military wing, General Major Muhraf Ahmad Abu Qasra, the continuance of cooperation with Iran remains questionable.
At the same time, the influence of Iran in local structures of power, and especially in Damascus and Homs, has become institutionalized. Through the presence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) members and their “economic footprint”, the Khatam al-Anbiya Company – Iran ensured control over a part of the energy field and construction projects in Central and Southern Syria.
The relations with Russia, which once seemed like a strategic partnership, are increasingly gaining the shape of a pragmatic rivalry. While Moscow is attempting to preserve its military domination in Latakia and Tartus, Iran is focused on the internal security infrastructure and the Shia network in Damascus and Aleppo.
For Iran, Iraq is more than a neighbor – it is the terrain in which the long-term strategy of the Axis of Resistance is defined. Until 2025, Iran completely integrate its influence into the institutional structures of Iraq. The most significant instrument of these processes remains the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), whose leading factions have become a part of the political establishment.
With the political influence, the economic influence of Iran in Iraq is also on the rise. The Iranian companies are controlling the majority of the electric energy and fuel markets in southern provinces, and the number of joint investments into oil fields around Basra is also on the rise. Besides the economy, the religious dimension remains the key to the long-term stability of Iranian influence. Pilot projects for the digitalization of Shia networks and monitoring of religious schools in Najaf enabled Tehran to unify the religious and political control under the guise of “soft power”.
However, this integration model also carries certain risks. Strengthening of the Iranian influence is inciting and anti-Iranian sentiment among the Sunni and Kurdish communities, which could, in the years to come, lead to a new phase of confessional fragmentation. Washington, even though with limited capacities, is attempting to maintain at least a partial counterbalance through diplomacy and economic aid.
The Iranian strategy in Syria and Iraq is not spontaneous – it is a part of the wider concept of the “strategic depth” being constructed by Tehran since the end of the previous century. This strategy rests on three pillars: controlled security dependence, religious and political mobilization, and economic symbiosis under sanctions. By combining these mechanisms, Iran created its zone of stability in the environment of continued crises.
By 2025, this zone will spread from Lebanon to Basra, via Damascus, Baghdad, and the southern part of Syria. With military presence in the form of advisory bases, Tehran is constructing infrastructural corridors that enable the transport of goods and energy towards the Mediterranean. In parallel, the democratic activity towards Saudi Arabia and Egypt signals an attempt to exit from isolation and positioning as a regional mediator.
What differentiates the Iranian model from classical imperial projections is its flexibility: Iran does not insist on direct domination, but on the formation of local networks that combine political dependence and cultural identification. Exactly this approach – discrete, but deeply rooted – makes it difficult to be suppressed, even in the conditions of military or diplomatic pressures.
Iran succeeded in Syria and Iraq, what just a few countries in the region could do – to turn its own policies into a permanent architecture of influence. This process is not simple and always completely successful: economic sanctions, dependence on religious structures, and growing local tensions are limiting its sustainability.
Therefore, if the first half of the 2020s was the decade of the return of Iran as an actor of resistance, the second could represent the time of its institutional consolidation. From the geopolitical standpoint, Tehran is no longer just a “regional challenge” – it is the model of the new type of power in a multipolar world: a power not based on open aggression, but on a combination of persistence, strategy, and religious legitimacy.
Author: Tanja Kazić